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It is commonly said that private employers possess complete 
control over the operation of their businesses, thus retaining the in­
herent authority to delegate any or all of that mag age rial power to 
an outside party. I Public employers, on the other hand, are limited 
in the extent to which they may delegate their managerial powers. 2 
This limitation is believed to be necessary in order to protect public 
control over basic policy decisions. 3 
One context in which this delegation may take place is in the 
arbitration4 of grievances5 arising out of a collective bargaining 
I. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement 0/Public Sector Grievance Arbitralion, 58 TEX. 
L. REV. 329, 338 (1980). 
2. fd. See also Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 
YALE L.J. 1156 (1974). "The private employers prerogatives are his to share as he sees 
fit, but the citizen's right to participate in governmental decisions cannot be bargained 
away by any public official." fd. at 1193. 
3. School Comm. v. Curry, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 158,325 N.E.2d 282, 287 (1975), 
qffd, 369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144, (1976). 
In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), Justice Powell wrote: 
Where a teachers' union, for example, acting pursuant to a state statute author­
izing collective bargaining in the public sector, obtains the agreement of the 
school board that teachers residing outside the school district will not be hired, 
the provision in the bargaining agreement to that effect has the same force as if 
the school board had adopted it by promulgating a regulation. Indeed, the rule 
in Michigan is that where a municipal COllective-bargaining agreement conflicts 
with an otherwise valid municipal ordinance, the ordinance must yield to the 
agreement. 
fd. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring). 
4. Arbitration is generally defined as the "reference of a dispute to an impartial 
(third) person chosen by the parties to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the 
arbitrator's award ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
5. Grievance arbitration is the resolution of a dispute arising between parties to an 
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agreement between public employees and their public employer.6 
To the extent that basic policy decisions are subsumed by the collec­
tive bargaining process and the subsequent enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements through grievance arbitration, effective pub­
lic control over government services is diminished.7 
A conflict arguably exists, however, between the need to prevent 
the delegation of managerial powers and the statutory duty of public 
employers to bargain with their employees on the issues of wages, 
hours and other conditions of employment.8 The conflict occurs be­
cause conditions of employment, which must be bargained, and 
managerial policy decisions, that ought not be delegated, are not sep­
arate and distinct areas as they often overlap.9 Further, the public 
employer may be required to bargain over procedures to settle griev­
ances that may culminate in binding arbitration \0 as a means of en­
forcing the collective bargaining agreement once reached. Thus, 
when an arbitrator is called in to enforce a collective bargaining 
agreement which involves both conditions of employment and a ba­
sic policy decision, a delegation of managerial powers takes place to 
the extent that the arbitrator's remedy removes the discretion of the 
existing collective bargaining agreement relating "either to the meaning or proper appli­
cation of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or an omitted case." 
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). 
Grievance arbitration should be distinguished from interest arbitration which is the 
process of resolving "disputes over the formulation of collective agreements or efforts to 
secure them. [It) arise[s) where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change 
the terms of one...." Id. Interest arbitration may alternatively be characterized as 
"impasse" or "major dispute" arbitration. Impasse or interest arbitration in the public 
sector in Massachusetts is governed by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E. § 9 (West 
1982). 
Grievance arbitration may be alternatively characterized as "rights," "minor" or 
"dispute" arbitration. DeWolf, The Enforcement of the Labor Arbitration Agreement in 
the Public Sector-The New York Experience, 39 ALB. L. REV. 393, 399-400 n.16 (1975). 
Grievance arbitration and not impasse arbitration is the subject of this comment. 
6. This is not to say that delegation and, hence, a violation of the doctrine cannot 
take place without an arbitrator. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Staples, 191 Mass. 384, 
386,77 N.E. 712, 713 (1906) (board of health could not delegate its power to another 
board); Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 241,248,89 N.E. 245, 248 (1909) (where 
city is entrusted by the legislature with the power to issue permits for rag storage, it may 
not redelegate that power to the fire chief). 
7. School Comm. v. Curry, 3 Mass. App. Ct. lSI, 158,325 N.E.2d 282, 287 (1975), 
affd, 369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976). 
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 6 (West 1982). 
9. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566,581,295 A.2d 526, 534 
(1972). 
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West 1982). 
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employer with regard to that decision. I I A delegation has occurred 
because it is the arbitrator and not the public employer who has 
made that decision. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has attempted to re­
solve this conflict through application of the non-delegation doc­
trine. The non-delegation doctrine prevents managerial prerogatives 
from being delegated to the arbitrator by narrowing the scope of 
remedies available to the grievance arbitrator. 12 In order to deter­
mine those circumstances in which the grievance arbitration agree­
ment should be respected from those circumstances in which 
preventing an unlawful delegation requires the agreement to yield, 
the court has looked to the relationship between Massachusetts' pub­
lic employee collective bargaining statute13 and public employer em-
II. See, e.g., Doherty v. School Comm., 363 Mass. 885, 885, 297 N.E.2d 994, 995 
(1973). See infra text accompanying notes 29-37. 
12. The non-delegation doctrine may also prevent bargaining over the matter en­
tirely. See Chief of Police v. Town of Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 502, 258 N.E.2d 531, 537­
38 (1970); School Comm. v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66,378 Mass. 65, 71-72, 389 
N.E.2d 970, 974 (1979); Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm., 386 Mass. 
197, 212, 434 N.E.2d 1258, 1267 (1982). But see School Comm. v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 563, 447 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (1983) (school committee decision to 
achieve a reduction in force by layoff not protected by non-delegation doctrine; proper 
and mandatory subject of bargaining). 
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 6 (West 1982). Massachusetts public em­
ployees were first granted the statutory right to form and organize labor organizations 
and to present proposals "relative to salaries and other conditions of employment" col­
lectively in 1958. Act of July 15, 1958, ch. 460, 1958 Mass. Acts 308, repealed by, Act of 
Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, 1973 Mass. Acts 1124 (relevant sections were reenacted and 
codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 2 (West 1982» (Chapter 
150E retains the right to join and form labor unions and to bargain collectively on ques­
tions of salaries and other terms and conditions of employment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 150E, § 2 (West 1982». Public employees were exempted from protection and 
regulation by the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 152(2) (1976». Massachusetts labor law also ex­
cluded public employees. Act of May 29, 1937, ch. 436, § 2(2), 1937 Mass. Acts 589, 590 
(codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, § 2(2) (West 1982». Thus, a 
large body of labor law was not applied to public employees. Grady, Collective Bargain­
ing and Public Employees, 9 B.B.J. Jan. 1965, at 9, 9. 
Two years later, the legislature granted authority to state and state subdivisions to 
enter collective bargaining agreements with its employees. Act of Aug. I, 1960, ch. 561, 
1960 Mass. Acts 488, repealed by Act of Nov. 17, 1965, ch. 763, § I, 1965 Mass. Act. 551, 
551 (under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1,6 (1982), the authority is rephrased as 
a duty to negotiate). While it would seem to follow logically from a grant to public 
employees of a right to bargain collectively that public employers would have the power 
to enter agreements with such organizations, city and town solicitors argued that they 
had no power to enter such agreements. Segal, 1960 Labor Laws In Massachusetts, 5 
B.B.J. Jan. 1961, at 15, 17. The 1960 legislation, therefore, "clarifie[d) the present law as 
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powering statutes. 14 The public employee bargaining statute 
enumerates certain statutes which are subordinate to a collective bar­
gaining agreement. IS Missing from that exhaustive list are, among 
others, empowering statutes for police commissioners l6 and statutes 
a declaration of policy to permit cities and towns to enter into collective bargaining 
agreements ...." Id. at 17. 
The legislative cycle was complete, Grady, supra, at 10, when the legislature im­
posed upon the state, Act of July 1, 1964, ch. 637, 1964 Mass. Acts 550, repealed by Act of 
Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, 1973 Mass. Acts 1124 (relevant section reenacted and codified as 
amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1,6 (West 1982» (Chapter 150E re­
tains duty to bargain with employee organizations, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, 
§§ 1 (defining "employer" as including the Commonwealth), 6 (imposing duty on public 
employer to negotiate) (West 1982», and then the municipalities, Act of Nov. 17, 1965, 
ch. 763, § 2, 1965 Mass. Acts 555, repealed by Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, 1973 Mass. 
Acts 1124 (relevant section reenacted and codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1,6 (West 1982) (Chapter 150E retains the municipal employers' duty 
to bargain with employee organizations, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1 (in­
cluding municipal employer within the definition of "employer"), 6 (imposing duty on 
public employer to negotiate) (West 1982», the duty to bargain with a duly recognized or 
certified bargaining representative. (A bargaining representative is recognized by a 
showing of 50% employee support or certified by an election held by the Labor Relations 
Commission. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 4 (West 1982». 
Grievance arbitration prior to 1973 was available only for municipal employees, and 
then only when the parties voluntarily agreed, Act of Nov. 17, 1965, ch. 763, § 2, 1965 
Mass. Acts 555,558, as amended by Act of June 16, 1970, ch. 445, 1970 Mass. Acts 273, 
Act of June 6, 1972, ch. 375, 1972 Mass. Acts 233 repealed by Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 
1078, § 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 1124. In 1973, the legislature permitted the state to agree to 
grievance arbitration, as well as the municipalities, and made significant changes pertain­
ing to exclusivity of remedy and modes of enforcement of agreements to arbitrate griev­
ances. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West 1982). See generally Note, Grievance 
Arbitration in the Public Sector: The New Massachusells Law, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 721 
(1975) for a discussion of the changes the 1973 statute made in existing law. 
In relation to the non-delegation doctrine, the Supreme Judicial Court has stated 
that there was no significant change between the pre-existing grievance arbitration stat­
ute, Act of Nov. 17, 1965, ch. 763, § 2, 1965 Mass. Acts 555, 558, as amended by Act of 
June 16, 1970, ch. 445, 1970 Mass. Acts 273, Act of June 6, 1972, ch. 375, 1972 Mass. Acts 
233, rfpealed by Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 1124 and the new 
grievance arbitration statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West 1982). School 
Comm. v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 688, 343 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1976) (dictum). Because 
the court was dealing with a school committee and its application of the non-delegation 
doctrine, this does not signify a failure of the court to recognize the new statutes applica­
tion to state employees or its changes in exclusivity of remedy or enforcement. See Note, 
supra, at 721. 
14. See infra notes 15-18. 
15. City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 898, 
899,402 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1980). More than seventy separate statutes are enumerated 
as subordinate to a collective bargaining agreement. Some are statutory wage rates, see, 
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 108D (West 1979) (minimum annual compensa­
tion), while others are public employer empowering statutes, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 35, §§ 50-56 (West Supp. 1982). 
16. Act of Apr. 14, 1906, ch. 291, 1906 Mass. Acts 253, as amended by Act of Apr. 
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establishing school committee manageriaP7 and hiring powers. IS 
Because these statutes are not subordinate to the collective bargain­
ing agreement, the supreme judicial court has held that the non-dele­
gation doctrine requires that conflicts between these agreements and 
the powers of police commissioners or school committees are to be 
resolved in favor of the public employer. 19 
Forming the foundation for the supreme judicial court's appli­
cation of the non-delegation doctrine is an assumption that expan­
sive use of grievance arbitration subsumes managerial 
prerogatives.20 This comment will trace the development of the non­
delegation doctrine in Massachusetts and describe the scope of its 
application. The doctrine's justification will then be examined in 
light of the policy and purposes of grievance arbitration. Finally, 
this comment will analyze the concern and assumptions of the 
supreme judicial court and will demonstrate that the court's concern 
may adequately be protected while allowing for a broader applica­
tion of grievance arbitration agreements. 
15,1962, ch. 322, § I, 1962 Mass. Acts 156. See City of Boston v. Boston Police Supervi­
sor Officers Fed'n, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 898, 899, 402 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1980). 
17. See School Comm. v. Korbut, 373 Mass. 788, 793 n.9, 369 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 
n.9 (1977). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37 (West 1971) provides: "[The school 
committee) shall have general charge of all the public schools and departments when not 
otherwise provided for. It may determine, subject to this chapter, the number of weeks 
and hours during which the schools shall be in session and may make regulations as to 
attendance therein." 
18. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 38 (West 1971). The relevant portions state 
that the school committee "shall elect and contract with the teachers of the public' 
schools, shall require full and satisfactory evidence of their moral character, and shall 
ascertain their qualifications for teaching and their capacity for the government of 
schools." Id. 
19. City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 898, 
899,402 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (1980); Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Berk­
shire Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. 522, 526-27, 377 N.E.2d 940, 944 (1978). 
Prior to enactment of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 7 (West 1982) Massachu­
setts law provided that collective bargaining agreements were subordinate to "any law, 
ordinance or by-law." Act of Nov. 17, 1965, ch. 763, § 2, 1965 Mass. Acts 555, 557, 
amended by Act of Aug. 3, 1967, ch. 514, 1967 Mass. Acts 380, Act of Apr. 3, 1969, ch. 
128, 1969 Mass. Acts 61, Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 341, 1969 Mass. Acts 174, Act of May 
20, 1970, ch. 340, 1970 Mass. Acts 178, repealed by Act of Nov. 26, 1973, ch. 1078, § I, 
1973 Mass. Acts 1124. Because chapter 150E repealed these statutes it is arguable that a 
collective bargaining agreement in compliance with scope of bargaining as provided by 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 6 (West 1982), and not excepted by section 7 is no 
longer either subordinate nor superior to any conflicting law. See School Comm. v. La­
bor Relations Comm'n, 388 Mass. 557, 566, 447 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (1983). 
20. See supra note 3; infra text accompanying notes 29 & 37. 
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II. ApPLICATION OF THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE IN 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Application of the non-delegation doctrine in Massachusetts has 
altered the grievance arbitration process in several respects. While 
managerial prerogatives cannot be subordinated to the collective 
bargaining agreement,21 grievances which involve both managerial 
prerogatives and bargainable topics may be separated to allow for an 
arbitration award.22 Typically such an award is limited to dam­
ages.23 This damage award, however, may be required by the court 
to be limited in order to protect managerial prerogatives from dele­
gation.24 Nevertheless, the supreme judicial court has recognized 
certain areas to which the doctrine will not apply.25 
A. 	 Separating Managerial Prerogatives from Wages, Hours and 
Conditions ofEmployment 
The supreme judicial court began its examination of the appro­
priate nexus between grievance arbitration and managerial preroga­
tives in Doherty v. School Committee. 26 In Doherty, an arbitrator 
reinstated a golf coach with back pay27 after finding that he was fired 
for his union activities which was in violation of his contract with the 
school committee.28 The court held that the power to appoint was a 
discretionary power reserved to the managerial prerogatives of the 
school committee and it set aside the reinstatement award on the 
grounds that the arbitrator superseded the committee's discretion.29 
Additionally, while the Doherty court set aside the reinstatement 
award, the arbitrator's award of money damages was allowed to 
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 38-42. 
23. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 47-49. 
25. See infra notes 52-64, 72-82 and accompanying text. 
26. 363 Mass. 885,297 N.E.2d 494 (1973). 
27. Id. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 495. 
28. See id. 
29. Id. To the extent that an arbitrator may not reinstate a teacher when the 
school committee's non-reappointment was based on union activities, the validity of Do­
herty is in doubt. In Blue Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Flight, 1981 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1240, 421 N.E.2d 755 (1981), the court held that reappointment is an appropriate 
arbitration remedy when unlawful sex discrimination was the basis for the school com­
mittee's dismissaL Id. at 1242,421 N.E.2d at 756. See infra notes 72-77 and accompany­
ing text. Because firing for union activity is unlawful under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
150E, § \O(a)(4) (West 1982), reinstatement should be an appropriate arbitration remedy. 
See also Southern Worcester Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations 
Comm'n, 386 Mass. 414, 436 N.E.2d 380 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 78-86. 
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stand30 without explanation.31 
The explanation absent in Doherty came three years later in 
School Commillee v. Raymond.32 Raymond was a director of music 
in the public schools. He was covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement which contained a grievance clause that provided for 
binding arbitration.33 The school committee abolished Raymond's 
position, reduced his salary and demoted him.34 Raymond's griev­
ance went to binding arbitration and the arbitrator ordered reinstate­
ment with back pay.35 Upon review of an application to vacate the 
award,36 the supreme judicial court found that the arbitrator could 
30. 363 Mass. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 495. 
31. See id. 
32. 369 Mass. 686, 343 N.E.2d 145 (1976). 
33. Id. at 687,343 N.E.2d at 147. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Awards may be vacated under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § II (West 
1982). Section II lists several grounds upon which an award may be vacated. Id. When 
a party moves to vacate an arbitration award on delegation grounds, the appropriate 
claim is that under section II(a)(3), "the arbitrators exceeded their powers ...." Id. 
§ II(a)(3). See School Comm. v. Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 847 n.4, 359 
N.E.2d 956, 957-58 n.4 (1977). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § 11(a)(5) (West 1982), states that "the fact that 
an award orders reinstatement of an employee with or without back pay ... shall not be 
grounds for vacating ... the award." Id. This provisio does not bar vacating an arbi­
trator's award on non-delegation grounds although the delegation may have occurred by 
the fact of reinstatement. See School Comm. v. Korbut, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 745, 358 
N.E.2d 831, 834, vacated on other grounds, 373 Mass. 788, 369 N.E.2d 1148 (1977). 
Arbitration may be stayed before proceedings commence under MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 150C, § 2(b) (West 1982). When a party seeks to stay arbitration on delegation 
groundS the appropriate claim is that the "claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a 
controversy covered by the provision for arbitration ...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
150C, § 2(b)(2) (West 1982). Massachusetts has adopted the presumption of arbitrability 
which holds that arbitration will be allowed unless the controversy is clearly excluded 
from arbitration in the collective bargaining agreement. School Comm. v. Tyman, 372 
Mass. 106, 113,360 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1977). When the claim is premised on non-delega­
tion grounds, however, a broad grievance arbitration provision cannot prevent a stay of 
arbitration although the controversy is not specifically excluded from the provision and 
would otherwise be arbitrable. This is so because the supreme judicial court has held 
that a dispute which cannot lawfully be arbitrated is equivalent to the absence of a con­
troversy covered by the arbitration provision. Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School 
Comm. v. Dennis Teachers Ass'n, 372 Mass. 116, 119,360 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1977). For 
further discussion of the presumption of arbitrability, see infra note 139. 
A party to the completed arbitration process may apply to the court to modify or 
correct the award under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § 12 (West 1982). Modifica­
tion generally entails only matters of form. Id. See also Pratt, Read & Co. v. United 
Furniture Workers, Local 105, 136 Conn. 205, 208, 70 A.2d 120, 122 (1949). While Prall 
was decided on the basis of Connecticut statutes, both CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-419 
(West Supp. 1983) and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § 12 (West 1982) are modeled 
on the UN1F. ARBITRATION ACT § 13,7 U.L.A. 68-69 (1956). Examination of how those 
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not reinstate Raymond because the decision to abolish a posltIon 
was within the exclusive nondelegable powers of the school commit­
tee and the arbitrator could not reverse that decision.37 At the same 
time, however, contracting against the loss of one's position and the 
reduction of one's pay is within legitimate employee concerns over 
wages, hours and conditions of employment.38 The court therefore 
held that the arbitrator was free to remedy this breach without im­
pinging upon the school committee's managerial prerogatives,39 and 
that an award of pay without reinstatement did not so infringe upon 
those prerogatives as to make the contract unenforceable.40 Thus, 
Raymond demonstrates that a matter which involves managerial 
prerogatives may also involve matters constituting hours, wages or 
other conditions of employment.41 If the two matters are separable 
and the arbitrator can fashion a remedy that protects the legitimate 
interests of the employee without infringing on managerial preroga­
tives, then arbitration may appropriately be allowed.42 
B. Limitation on the Compensation Award 
While an arbitrator may award back pay as a remedy for the 
statutes have been construed in other jurisdictions, therefore, may be a fruitful means of 
determining their meaning. See School Comm. v. Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 371 Mass. 845, 
848, 359 N.E.2d 956, 958 (1977). When arbitration awards are separated by the court, 
allowing compensation awards to stand while vacating the unlawful reinstatement, see 
infra text accompanying notes 38-52, the awards are "modified" under section 12(a)(2) 
which states: "[t)he arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and 
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues 
submitted." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § 12(a)(2) (West 1982). See Raymond, 
369 Mass. at 691, 343 N.E.2d at 149. 
An arbitration award will be confirmed upon application of any party if, within ten 
days, there have been no applications to modify, correct or vacate the award or if the 
application to vacate is denied. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, §§ 10, II(d), 8 (West 
1982). 
Judicial review of an arbitration award is limited in scope. The function of the court 
is limited to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration has stated a claim which, 
on its face, is governed by the terms of the contract, United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960), or the other narrow grounds provided by 
chapter 150C, City of Lawrence v. Falzarano, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571, 581,402 N.E.2d 
1017, 1024 (1980). Provided the arbitrators do not exceed the scope of issues submitted 
to them, they are empowered to make errors of law or fact without judicial correction. 
Trustees of Boston & Maine Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 
390, 294 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1973). 
37. See Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 691, 343 N.E.2d at 149. 
40. Id. 
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
42. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
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contract breach, an arbitration award may be tantamount to an un­
lawful appointment43 when the duration of the award is unlimited. 
Thus, to protect managerial prerogatives from delegation, the arbi­
tration award may be subject to limitation. 
In School Committee v. New Bedford Educators Association, 44 an 
arbitrator awarded an unsuccessful applicant for a guidance coun­
selor position, the difference in pay between her position as a teacher 
and the position for which she applied until the appointment was 
made.45 The court, while recognizing that the arbitrator could 
award compensation as a remedy, vacated the indefinite pay differ­
ential award.46 The court noted that the school committee would 
have no real alternative but to capitulate and make the appointment 
if the payments continued indefinitely.47 "While the school commit­
tee must be encouraged [to honor its contract] and the grievant's in­
jury should be redressed, an arbitration award cannot, in the guise of 
compensation, accomplish indirectly what a direct order may not do. 
It cannot 'supersede the discretion legislatively vested' in the school 
committee."48 Thus, an award must be limited so as not to force a 
committee to capitulate and make the appointment.49 
C. Reinstatement May Be Ordered in Some Circumstances 
There are two general circumstances in which reinstatement 
may be ordered: I) where reinstatement would allow the school 
committee to follow contractual procedures rather than being based 
upon a contractual entitlement; and 2) where reinstatement remedies 
a practice of unlawful discrimination. 
1. Contractual Procedures 
In School Committee v. Korbut ,50 the supreme judicial court ad­
dressed the question of whether the reinstatement remedy might not 
offend the non-delegation doctrine in certain circumstances. In so 
doing Korbut modified the Raymond rule that an arbitrator may 
never reinstate a teacher.51 In Korbut, a language arts coordinator 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37. 
44. 9 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 405 N.E.2d 162 (1980). 
45. Id. at 794, 405 N.E.2d at 163. 
46. Id. at 802, 405 N.E.2d at 168. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. /d. at 803, 405 N.E.2d at 168. 
50. 373 Mass. 788, 369 N.E.2d 1148 (1977). 
51. 369 Mass. at 690,434 N.E.2d at 148. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
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was not reappointed due to allegedly unsatisfactory performance. 52 
Korbut grieved claiming that the school committee failed to follow 
its contractually required notice and hearing procedures. 53 The arbi­
trator agreed and ordered Korbut's reinstatement. 54 On appeal from 
an order vacating55 the award, the supreme judicial court reversed.56 
The court allowed reinstatement as an appropriate remedy because, 
in this instance, the reinstatement did not impair the school commit­
tee's ultimate power to discharge Korbut, but only provided the 
school committee with additional time to follow the agreed upon 
procedures.57 After such procedures were followed, Korbut could 
then be freely terminated by the committee58 without recourse. 
Reinstatement has also been held to be an appropriate remedy 
where contractual procedures have not been followed and the school 
committee has not indicated that the claimant was disqualified. ,-Re­
instatement may be ordered even though the power not to reappoint 
will be impaired. In Bradley v. School Committee,59 the school com­
mittee failed to follow the agreed procedures in transferring incum­
bent principals to vacancies occurring in principalships in other 
schools.60 The agreed procedure left the opportunity for the school 
committee to deny the request for transfer.6) At the point in which 
the arbitrator ordered the school committee to follow the procedure, 
however, the award was tantamount to ordering the school commit­
tee to approve the transfer requests.62 The supreme judicial court 
affirmed the superior court's confirmation63 of the award.64 
52. 373 Mass. at 790, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
53. Id. at 790-91, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
54. Id. at 791, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
55. Id.; see supra note 36. 
56. 373 Mass. at 793, 369 N.E.2d at 1151. 
57. Id. at 796-97, 369 N.E.2d at 1153-54. 
58. Id. at 798, 369 N.E.2d at 1154. The court assumed that allowing arbitration 
with regard to procedures provided some measure of protection to the employee. One 
commentator, in discussing this procedure protection argument noted that "this right to 
arbitrate may be illusory. Even if the procedures were violated what remedy is avail­
able? The arbitrator can require the procedures to be followed but the board still makes 
the determination of tenure decisions!" Vaccaro, Sign(/icance of Rece.nt lJecisions on 
Grievance Arbitrability in Public Sector Labor Relations, 8 J. OF L. & Eouc. 379, 384 n.9 
(1979). 
59. 373 Mass. 53, 364 N.E.2d 1229 (1977). 
60. Id. at 54-55, 364 N .E.2d at 1231. 
61. Id. at 54, 364 N.E.2d at 1231. 
62. Id. at 59, 364 N.E.2d at 1234. 
63. Arbitration awards are confirmed under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, 
§ \0 (West 1982). See supra note 36. 
64. 373 Mass. at 60, 364 N.E.2d at 1234. 
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The Bradley court's approach represents a radical departure 
from the existing non-delegation theory. While the court had previ­
ously held that collective bargaining agreements must be 
subordinate to managerial prerogatives,65 the Bradley court applied 
a balancing test.66 The court stated: "[w]e must decide whether the 
issues of educational policy which are implicated in the criteria for 
filling vacant principalships so outweigh the similarly implicated is­
sues of employment conditions that the committee cannot make even 
voluntary agreements on this subject."67 The court found that the 
procedures for filling vacant principalships "lacked the prerogative 
quality" to prevent confirmation of the arbitrator's award.68 The 
procedure lacked prerogative quality because it did not eliminate the 
committee's right to disapprove transfer requests.69 In this case, be­
cause the committee did not disapprove of the qualifications of the 
incumbents, this was tantamount to the school committee's ap­
provapo Thus, the court found that no improper delegation had oc­
curred even if the arbitrator's award had been tantamount to an 
appointment.71 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. 
66. 373 Mass. at 57-58, 364 N.E.2d at 1233. The balancing test was ignored only 
one year later in Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Berkshire Educ. Ass'n, 
375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978), in which the court held that the school committee 
had no power to bargain away managerial power because the empowering statutes, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ 37,38 (West 1971), were not subordinate to collective 
bargaining agreements. Berkshire Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. at 527-28, 377 N.E.2d at 943­
44; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 7 (West 1982); see supra note 19. In City of 
Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 402 N.E.2d 1098 
(1980), the balancing test was again not applied in the context of police bargaining. Be­
cause the police commissioners empowering statute, Act of Apr. 14, 1906, ch. 291, 1906 
Mass. Acts 253, as amended by Act of Apr. 15, 1962, ch. 323, 1962 Mass. A~ts 156, is not 
made subordinate to collective bargaining agreements by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
150E, § 7 (West 1982), the power of the commissioner must necessarily prevail. Bos/on 
Police, 9 Mass. App. Ct. at 762, 402 N.E.2d at 1099. 
The balancing test re-emerged, however, in Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. 
School Comm., 386 Mass. 197,434 N.E.2d 1258 (1982). In Bos/on Teachers, the court 
balanced the interests of the school committee in protecting its managerial prerogatives 
to determine class size for one fiscal year with employee interests in job security. fd. at 
213, 434 N .E.2d 1267-68. The job security clause was enforceable in part because of the 
diminished managerial interest after the budget had been accepted. fd. Thus, because of 
the courts vacillation as to use of the balancing test, the extent to which claims of em­
ployee interest may overcome the implicated managerial prerogatives is unclear. 
67. Bradley, 373 Mass. at 57-58, 364 N.E.2d at 1233 (citation omitted). 
68. fd. at 58, 364 N.E.2d at 1233. 
69. fd. 
70. See id. at 60, 364 N.E.2d at 1234. 
71. See id. 
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2. Unlawful Discrimination 
The second circumstance in which an arbitrator may make an 
appointment as part of the arbitration award is where the school 
committee's appointment decision was based upon unlawful discrim­
ination. For example, if the school committee engages in unlawful 
sex discrimination, the arbitrator may order the committee to make 
the unlawfully refused promotion. In Blue Hills Regional J)istrict 
School Committee v. Flight ,72 the arbitrator found a contract viola­
tion in the school committee's discrimination against a teacher on 
the basis of her sex.73 The court allowed reinstatement to stand ex­
plicitly as an exception to the non-delegation doctrine.74 In Flight 
there was no finding of implied approval of the teacher's qualifica­
tions75 and the award did not provide the school committee with the 
opportunity to evaluate the teacher.16 Thus, an award of promotion 
clearly was a delegation to the arbitrator of the school committee's 
power to make promotions.77 
Unlawful discrimination based upon union activity also may 
form the basis for an exception to the general rule that a school com­
mittee's appointment power may not be delegated to a third person. 
Unlawful discrimination may be remedied by appointment, even in 
those circumstances where the remedy will amount to granting ten­
ure to the aggrieved teacher and deprive the school committee of its 
inherent managerial power. 
In Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School J)is­
72. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1240,421 N.E.2d 755 (1981). 
73. Id. at 1240,421 N.E.2d at 756. 
74. Id. at 1242,421 N.E.2d at 756. 
75. See id. at 1240-43,421 N.E.2d at 755-57. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 1242,421 N.E.2d at 756. Compare Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. 
Comm. v. Berkshire Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978) (appointment to 
principalship a non-delegable prerogative) with Bradley v. School Comm., 373 Mass. 53, 
364 N.E.2d 1229 (1977) (principal may be appointed where procedures were violated and 
there was an implied approval of candidate's qualifications). For a more detailed discus­
sion see supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. The choice of principals then, is a 
non-delegable managerial prerogative. Appointment by the arbitrator, however, may be 
allowed where, either the school committee has not disqualified the candidate, Flight, 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1240-43,421 N.E.2d at 755-57, or where the procedures ordered 
to be followed by the arbitrator will merely allow the school committee better opportu­
nity to evaluate the candidate without impeding the ultimate choice by the committee to 
appoint or not to appoint. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. In Flight, by con­
trast, the arbitration award did impede the school committee's ultimate discretion 
whether or not to retain the aggrieved teacher. Blue Hills Regional Dist. School Comm. 
v. Flight, \0 Mass. App. Ct. 459, 468, 409 N.E.2d 226, 232-33 (1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1240,421 N.E.2d 755 (1981). 
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Iriel v. Labor Relalions Commission,78 the Labor Relations Commis­
sion79 ordered reinstatement as a remedy for antiunion 
discrimination.80 The order effectively granted tenure.81 Rather 
than announcing an additional exception to the non-delegation doc­
trine, the court held that the doctrine did not apply.82 The court 
reasoned that, insofar as failing to reappoint a teacher for union ac­
tivity was unlawful,83 there was no managerial prerogative to do 
SO.84 The court did not reject the notion that delegation of the school 
board's power to· grant tenure against its will was unlawfu1.85 
Rather, it found that if reinstatement could not be ordered, "unlaw­
ful antiunion discrimination in tenure decisions would never be sub­
ject to redress.86 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the non-delegation 
doc~rjne has evolved extensively from the original Doherty ap­
proach, which might have been interpreted as disallowing binding 
grievance arbitration altogether when the issue involved non-delega­
ble managerial prerogatives. In Raymond, a bifurcated approach 
was adopted allowing the arbitrator to award compensation to the 
aggrieved teacher in order to protect the teacher's legitimate con­
cerns over wages, hours and other conditions of employment without 
impeding the school committee's non-delegable managerial preroga­
78. 386 Mass. 414, 436 N.E.2d 380 (1982). 
79. Under MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § II (West 1982), the Labor Rela­
tions Commission is empowered to investigate prohibited practices under MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 10 (West 1982). If the commission determines that a prohibited 
practice has been committed it may require the party responsible to cease and desist the 
prohibited practice and take "such further affirmative action as will comply with the 
provisions of[the) section...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 11 (West 1982). 
The commission found that the school committee had violated MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 150E, § IO(a)(I) and (3) (West 1982). Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 417, 
436 N.E.2d at 383. Section IO(a)(I) makes it a prohibited practice for an employer to 
"[i)nterfere, restrain or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed 
under this chapter ...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § IO(a)(I) (West 1982). 
While not stated in the Southern Worcester opinion, because the teachers were denied 
reappointment for union activity, the right interfered with was probably their chapter 
150E, § 2 right to join or assist employee organizations. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
150E, § 2 (West 1982). Section IO(a)(3) makes it a prohibited practice to "[d)iscriminate 
in regard to hiring, tenure, or any other term or condition of employment to encourage or 
discourage membership in any employee organization ...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 150E, § IO (West 1982). 
80. Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 417,436 N.E.2d at 383. 
81. Id. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 385. 
82. /d. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 386. See supra note 29. 
83. See supra note 79. 
84. Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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tives involved in the same issue.87 The Raymond court assumed that 
reinstatement power would be beyond the arbitrator's powers in any 
case.88 The Korbut court, however, put the reinstatement power into 
the arbitrator's remedial arsenal, but only if the school committee 
would not be deprived of making the ultimate appointment choice.89 
Bradley further expanded the Korbut rule by allowing reinstatement 
by the arbitrator in cases where, although the actual award would 
deprive the school committee of its ultimate appointment power, the 
contractual procedure breached by the school committee would not 
have deprived the committee of that power if the procedure had 
properly been followed. 90 Moreover, the Southern Worcester court 
found reinstatement to be a proper remedy in cases of unlawful dis­
crimination without regard to whether the school committee was de­
prived of non-delegable powers.91 
While the supreme judicial court has recognized the statutory 
right of employees to bargain for an entitlement to a position, it still 
will not tolerate an abrogation of the employer's inviolate manage­
rial prerogative to freely discharge, demote, or fail to appoint an em­
ployee92 even if doing so contravenes the collective bargaining 
agreement.93 Where reinstatement will impede the employer's pre­
rogative, the arbitration remedy will be limited to compensation and 
87. 369 Mass. at 690-91, 343 N.E.2d at 148-49; see supra text accompanying notes 
32-40. 
88. See 369 Mass. at 691, 343 N.E.2d at 149. 
89. 373 Mass. at 796-97,369 N.E.2d at 1153-54; see supra text accompanying notes 
50-58. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
91. Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 386; see supra text accom­
panying notes 78-86. 
92. Provided of course that the decision is not motivated by unlawful discrimina­
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77. 
93. Compare Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Berkshire Hills 
Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978) (appointment as a remedy prohibited 
in arbitration to enforce contractual procedures for initial principalship appointments) 
with Bradley v. School Comm., 373 Mass. 53, 364 N.E.2d 1229 (1977) (appointment rem­
edy available to arbitrator to enforce procedures for filling vacant principal positions 
with incumbent principals). In Berkshire Hills the agreement precluded employer discre­
tion not to make the appointment. 375 Mass. at 526-27, 377 N.E.2d at 943. In Bradl£Cv it 
did not. 373 Mass. at 60, 364 N.E.2d at 1234. See also School Comm. v. Curry, 3 Mass. 
App. 151,325 N.E.2d 282 (1975), qffd, 369 Mass. 638, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976), in which 
reinstatement was held not to be an appropriate remedy for the school committee's act of 
abolishing a supervisory position in contravention of the collective bargaining agreement 
because the action was deemed to be a matter of educational policy and therefor under 
the managerial control of the school committee. Id. at 157,325 N.E.2d at 286-87. In Mt. 
Greylock Faculty Ass'n v. Mt. Greylock Regional School Comm., No. 1139-1857-80, slip 
op. (American Arbitration Ass'n May 22, 1981) (Hogan, Arb.), the arbitrator found a 
seniority agreement to be non-arbitrable because the seniority procedures deprived the 
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reinstatement will not be allowed.94 An issue not addressed by the 
court, however, is whether grievance arbitration without a reinstate:­
ment remedy comports with the policies and purposes of grievance 
arbitration. In view of the recognized effectiveness of reinstatement 
as a remedy, this issue demands closer examination. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 The Non-Delegation Doctrine and its Effect on Adequate 
Contract Enforcement: Restricting the Reinstatement 
Remedy 
A collective bargaining agreement provides the basis for the 
ongoing relationship between the employer and its organized em­
ployees.95 Unfortunately, the collective bargaining agreement is un­
able to address all of the various circumstances in which a dispute 
may arise; therefore, breakdowns in the ongoing relationship be­
tween employer and employees are inevitable.96 
Historically, the primary means of resolving disputes in the pri­
vate sector was the strike.97 As an appropriate corollary to an agree­
ment not to strike, the grievance arbitration procedure became 
favored as a matter of national labor policy in the private sector.98 
As damaging as strikes are in the private sector, striking in the public 
sector damages not only the parties involved but it is also very costly 
to the public.99 In Massachusetts, where public sector striking is pro­
hibited by statute,IOO the need for effective grievance arbitration is 
particularly acute in order to protect the integrity of the collective 
bargaining agreement and the working relationship between public 
employer and employees. lOl The non-delegation doctrine, however, 
committee of its discretion to decide which teachers "must go." Id. at 17 (emphasis in 
original). 
94. See Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
95. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
580 (1960). 
96. /d. at 580-81. 
97. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No.3, 464 Pa. 92, 100, 
346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975). 
98. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
580 (1960). 
99. Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No.3, 464 Pa. 92, 100, 
346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975). 
100. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9A (West 1982). 
101. Note, Legality and Propriety ofAgreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Dis­
putes in Public Employment. 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129. 136-38 (1968). 
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prevents effective use of grievance arbitration because it limits the 
availability of the reinstatement remedy to the grievance arbitrator. 
The ineffectiveness of fashioning a remedy without reinstate­
ment was recognized by the supreme judicial court in Southern 
Worcester County Regional Vocational School District v. Labor Rela
tions Commission. 102 Southern Worcester did not involve grievance 
arbitration, but rather the Labor Relations Commission'slO3 effort to 
remedy unlawful school district firings for union activity. 104 The La­
bor Relations Commission ordered reinstatement of the aggrieved 
employees as a remedy. 105 The school district contended that the 
reinstatement remedy violated the non-delegation doctrine because 
reinstatement would result in tenure, thus depriving the district of its 
power to make tenure decisions. I06 The court rejected this opportu­
nity to bar reinstatement by holding that the non-delegation doctrine 
did not apply.107 
Reinstatement in Southern Worcester, however, did divest the 
school committee of its power to make tenure decisions. lOS The 
granting of tenure is a power vested exclusively in a school commit­
tee and may not be delegated. 109 To avoid the argument that this 
action violated the non-delegation doctrine, the court held that the 
power of the school committee to make appointment decisions had 
been limited by the legislature and did not include the power to base 
decisions upon union activity.110 It is unquestionably true that the 
school committee lacks the power to base its decisions on a prospec­
tive appointee's union activity. I I I It does not follow, however, that 
to divest the school committee of this power necessarily implies that 
reinstatement must be a remedy for the school committee's breach in 
this regard. Rather, it would be more appropriate, in light of the 
non-delegation doctrine, to limit the remedy available to the 
wronged employees to compensation,112 which would not be tanta­
mount to an indirect appointment. I 13 This approach would compen­
\02. 386 Mass. 414, 436 N.E.2d 380 (1982). 
\03. See supra note 79. 
104. 386 Mass. at 417, 436 N.E.2d at 383. 
\05. Id. 

\06. Id. at 423,436 N.E.2d at 386. 

\07. Id. at 423-24, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 

\08. Id. at 421,436 N.E.2d at 385. 

\09. School Comm. v. Tyman, 372 Mass. \06, 113, 360 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1977). 

110. Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § \O(a)(3) (West 1982). 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49. 
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sate the aggrieved employees while still respecting the inviolate 
power of the school committee to make academic appointments. 114 
In rejecting this approach, the Southern Worcester court recognized 
that without the reinstatement remedy, the statutory right not to be 
fired for union activity would be illusory. I 15 The court stated that if 
reinstatement were not allowed, "unlawful antiunion discrimination 
in tenure decisions would never be subject to redress. This is a result 
we decline to reach." 116 
Southern Worcester demonstrates that reinstatement as a rem­
edy for unlawful union activity is permissible, although the remedy 
deprives the school committee of its non-delegable powers. This re­
sult, however, has been reached only in grievance arbitration involv­
ing unlawful discrimination. In other contexts, the remedy of the 
arbitrator must be fashioned carefully so as not to infringe upon 
non-delegable powers. This may require the arbitrator to forego re­
instatement although it may be the only appropriate remedy under 
the circumstances. 
School Committee v. New Bedford Educators Association 117 is a 
grievance arbitration case in which reinstatement by the arbitrator 
was disallowed. In New Bedford, an arbitrator found that an appli­
cant had been wrongfully denied an appointment to a guidance 
counselor position because the school committee had breached its 
contract. IIS The contract required that the school committee formu­
late its own qualification standards and abide by them in making the 
appointment. 119 The court found that the arbitrator could not have 
the power to appoint the aggrieved teacher to the denied position as 
a contract breach remedy,120 because to do so would delegate the 
school committee's power, to choose guidance counselors, to the ar­
bitrator. 121 The arbitrator was allowed to award money damages l22 
provided the damages were not tantamount to an indirect 
appointment. 123 
114. See Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690-91, 343 N.E.2d at 148-49. 
115. Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423-24, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
116. Id. See a/so Grady, The Interface ofArbitration and the Law, 18 B.B.J. June, 
1974, at 29. To the extent that public employees are permitted to negotiate grievance 
arbitration agreements but reinstatement is barred as a remedy "[t)he public employee 
... wins a Pyrrhic victory, one of form but not of substance." Id. at 33. 
117. 9 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 405 N.E.2d 162 (1980). 
118. /d. at 797, 405 N.E.2d at 165. 
119. Id. at 795, 405 N.E.2d at 164. 
120. /d. at 798, 405 N.E.2d at 165. 
121. /d. at 802, 405 N .E.2d at 168. 
122. /d. at 802-03, 405 N.E.2d at 168. 
123. /d. at 803, 405 N.E.2d at 168; see a/so supra text accompanying notes 43-49. 
716 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:699 
It would have been consistent with Southern Worcester to find 
that, without reinstatement as a remedy, the contract provisions in 
New Bedford would have been unenforceable and thus not subject to 
redress. 124 To attempt to harmonize the results in Southern Worce~­
ter and other non-delegation cases embodying the principles set 
forth in New Bedford,125 the court noted that in New Bedford the 
agreement to follow a prescribed method of appointing guidance 
counselors was voluntary, while in Southern Worcester the duty not 
to fire for union activity was statutory.126 Thus, a voluntary agree­
ment to adhere to committee-chosen qualification standards is an in­
fringement upon managerial prerogatives when remedied by 
appointment. 127 But when the limitation on school committee pre­
rogatives is statutory, a grievance may be remedied by reinstatement 
by an arbitrator, although no independent statutory authorization 
exists for the reinstatement remedy.128 
B. 	 Negotiating the Grievance Arbitration Agreement as an Exercise 
ofManagerial Prerogatives 
Not all jurisdictions have agreed that voluntary agreements by a 
124. 	 Cf Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423-24, 436 N.E.2d at 386. 
125. See id. at 423, 436 N.E.2d at 386. The court was not comparing New Bedford 
Educators and Southern Worcester, but rather School Comm. v. Tyman, 372 Mass. 106, 
360 N.E.2d 877 (1977), another non-delegation case. New Bedford is being used gener­
ally here as a non-delegation case to describe the coun's reasoning. The principles are 
the same. 
126. 	 Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 424, 436 N.E.2d at 381. 
127. 	 Id. 
128. See Flight, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242,421 N.E.2d at 756. While MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § II (West 1982), authorizes the Labor Relations Commis­
sion to reinstate an employee as a remedy for unfair employer practices, this does not 
explain why the supreme judicial coun will allow reinstatement by an arbitrator as a 
remedy for grievances involving unlawful discrimination but not when the grievance in­
volves a contractual breach. No statutory authority exists for the grievance arbitrator, as 
opposed to the Labor Relations Commission, to reinstate an employee to remedy unlaw­
ful discrimination, and such reinstatement amounts to a delegation of otherwise inviolate 
managerial powers. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. 
It may be argued that this disparity between authorized remedies is justified as a 
matter of policy-the need for heightened protection of teachers from unlawful discrimi­
nation. See Southern Worcester, 386 Mass. at 423-24,436 N.E.2d at 386. This argument 
assumes that there is more reason, as a matter of policy, to protect teachers from unlaw­
ful discrimination than to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining agreement. 
Such a view is inconsistent with the elaborate protections afforded teachers by the legisla­
ture in organizing teacher unions, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ I, 10, II (West 
1982), and in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. /d. §§ 6, 10, II. If the Labor 
Relations Commission is authorized to reinstate teachers to protect their organizational 
rights, such protection is meaningless if effective enforcement of the 'collective bargain­
ing, the fruits of public teacher unionism, is denied. See supra note 116. 
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school committee to limit its discretion to make unilateral manage­
rial decisions over certain issues constitutes an infringement on man­
agerial discretion, and therefore, an unlawful delegation. The 
Supreme Court of Ohio in Dayton Classroom Teachers Association v. 
Dayton Board ofEducation 129 stated: 
[N]either reason nor authority prohibits a board of education from 
manifesting its policy decision in written form and calling the 
writing an agreement or contract. It cannot seriously be argued 
that entering into such an agreement is a departure from, or sur­
render of independent exercise of the boards policy-making 
power. 130 
Further, the court held that there was no infringement of those pre­
rogatives by enforcing the contract through grievance arbitration. 131 
. In Massachusetts, as in Ohio, the collective bargaining agree­
ment is voluntarily entered and represents an independent exercise 
of a board's policy-making power. The agreement is voluntary be­
cause there is no compulsion to include any particular clause or issue 
into a collective bargaining agreement. Under Massachusetts public 
employee collective bargaining statues,132 a public employer is 
bound to "negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, stan­
dards of productivity and performance, and any other term and con­
ditions of employment, but such obligation shall not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession."133 Should an 
impasse result, no contract is forced upon the school committee or 
the union unless the parties mutually agree to binding impasse arbi~ 
tration. 134 Moreover, because public employees cannot strike in 
Massachusetts,135 they cannot impose specific demands on the public 
employer which it would not otherwise be inclined to accept. 
129. 141 Ohio St.2d 127,323 N.E.2d 714 (1975). 
130. Id. at 134, 323 N.E.2d at 718. In Dayton the Teachers Association brought 
proceedings to compel the board to honor its arbitration agreement in respect to a 
number of grievances including a claim that a substitute teacher was not placed on salary 
pursuant to the agreement. Id. at 123, 323 N.E.2d at 715. The lower courts found that 
the agreement to go to binding arbitration an unlawful delegation of the board's manage­
ment powers. Id. at 129,323 N.E.2d at 716. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that it was 
not. Id. at 134, 323 N.E.2d at 718. 
Particularly relevant to this discussion is that in Dayton the court did not differenti­
ate between the other grievances and the one involving the appointment of a substitute. 
The court allowed the grievance to go to arbitration. Id. at 134,323 N.E.2d at 719. 
131. Id. at 134,323 N.E.2d at 718. 
132. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 6 (West 1982). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. § 9. 
135. Id. § 9A. 
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It is therefore clear that the resulting collective bargaining 
agreement is a voluntary agreement on the part of the school com­
mittee. Thus, the concern that public control over management of 
government will be subsumed by the collective bargaining agree­
ment is overstated. 136 As the Dayton court recognized, school com­
mittee discretion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's quid 
pro quo for public control,137 is exercised in the process of agreeing 
to the collective bargaining agreement.l38 Similarly, concern that re­
instatement as a remedy subsumes managerial prerogatives is also 
overstated; while the parties may agree to binding grievance arbitra­
tion, there is no requirement on how broad or narrow the scope of 
that procedure shall be. 139 Further, the arbitrator called in to en­
136. Cf Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. 
REV. 885, 912 (1973) ("The desire to avoid illegal delegations of power, as well as the 
reluctance to permit employee groups to encroach upon areas entrusted to the discretion 
of a political agency are unquestionably valid, if often overstated, concerns of the 
court."). 
137. Curry, 3 Mass. App. at 158,325 N.E.2d at 287. 
138. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
139. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 8 (West 1982). One commentator 
has suggested that the public employer be more aggressive in negotiating grievance arbi­
tration agreements concerning those matters that are traditionally reserved to manage­
ment. He suggested that those matters be retained by management through the vehicle 
of the agreement. Vaccaro, supra note 58, at 389-90. "In the private sector employers 
long since have recognized the importance of reserving, through the vehicle of the man­
agement's rights clause, the traditional rights of management. The management rights 
clause ... is now becoming essential." Id. The management's rights clause may "re­
strict, by express contractual language the types of matters which may be taken to arbi­
tration." Id. at 390. 
Vaccaro was responding to the general public sector adoption of the presumption of 
arbitrability, see id. at 389, which provides that a grievance sliould be allowed to go to 
arbitration "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). The presumption of 
arbitrability was adopted by the United States Supreme Court as a matter of national 
labor policy. The Court found that if courts were allowed to infer bars to grievance 
arbitration from vague management's rights clauses "the arbitration clause would be 
swallowed up by the exception." Id. at 584. 
In essence, however, it is the non-delegation doctrine that has become the judicially 
created management's rights clause. See Curry, 369 Mass. at 685, 343 N.E.2d at 145. To 
the extent that the non-delegation doctrine interferes with appropriate enforcement of 
the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitration clause has been "swallowed up" by 
the exception. 
The Massachusetts courts, however, have demonstrated that the public employer 
may successfully prevent losing control over certain discretionary decisions by bargain­
ing the appropriate explicit language into the collective bargaining agreement. In School 
Comm. v. Brown, 375 Mass. 502, 277 N.E.2d 935 (1978), the court prevented arbitration 
of sabbatical leave, not on delegation grounds, but because the language of the contract 
clearly reserved such decisions to the school committee. Id. at 505, 377 N.E.2d at 937-38. 
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force the contract is bound by the scope of the issues that the parties 
have agreed to submit to arbitration. l40 Thus, the matters which 
mayor may not be arbitrated are a result of voluntary agreement, 
and that agreement is an independent exercise of the school commit­
tee's discretion. 141 
Finally, reinstatement per se is not unlawful 142 and has been 
approved by the supreme judicial court as an inherent part of the 
grievance arbitration agreement 143 unless barred by the non-delega­
tion doctrine. 1M Therefore, to the extent that the public employer 
agrees to binding arbitration, it has agreed implicitly to the reinstate­
ment remedy. If this agreement is voluntary, then the employer ex­
ercised its discretion in that agreement. 145 Under such 
circumstances, there can be no delegation problem whenever the ar­
bitration process is invoked and reinstatement is afforded as a rem-
Brown stands as a response to the fear that management will lose control over matters 
not legislatively required to be bargained into the collective bargaining agreement by 
demonstrating that much control is left to management's successful bargaining. See Vac­
caro, supra note 58, at 389. See also Summers, supra note 2, in which the author states 
that "[t]he duty to bargain on a subject does not require the public employer to surrender 
flexibility.... As in the private sector, the public employer can bargain for a flexible 
rule or even for full discretion in regulating the subject during the contract period." Id. 
at 1194 n.71. 
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § 2(b)(2) (West 1982). 
141. See Local 953, Int'l Union of AFSCME v. School Dis!., 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2419 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1967). The court upheld the legality of a binding arbitration provi­
sion in a public school teacher contract. In doing so it noted: I) that the agreement was 
voluntary and both parties benefitted from it; 2) that the provision for binding arbitration 
limited the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to the provisions of the contract; and 3) that the 
arbitrator was chosen jointly by the parties. Id. at 2421. 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72, 78. 
143. See, e.g., Korbul, 373 Mass. 788, 369 N.E.2d 1148 (1977). There was no dis­
cussion in Korbul as to whether reinstatement as a remedy was authorized by the collec­
tive bargaining agreement; it was assumed by the court that it was. This is consistent 
with the policy towards arbitration enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), in 
which Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated: 
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective 
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgement to bear in order to 
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to 
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety 
of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy 
should be awarded to meet a particular contingency. 
Id. at 597. And see id. at 598-99. This principle, that an arbitrator should be afforded 
flexibility in fashioning a remedy-whether or not specifically authorized by the collec­
tive bargaining agreement, has been cited with approval by the supreme judicial court in 
Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm., 370 Mass. 455, 467, 350 N.E.2d 707, 
716 (1976). 
144. See, e.g., Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
145. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. 
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edy.146 Because the non-delegation doctrine interferes with the 
arbitration process and renders meaningful enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements illusory, it can only be defended on the 
ground that it is the only way to protect public control over govern­
mental processes. But, because public control is already protected 
through the collective bargaining process, the doctrine should be ab­
rogated insofar as it bars the reinstatement remedy. By abrogating 
the non-delegation doctrine to this extent, grievance arbitration will 
provide more meaningful protection of collective bargaining rights 
without impeding public control over management of the public 
schools. 147 
C. 	 The Fjfects of the Non-Delegation Doctrine on the Speedy 
Resolution ojDisputes and the Expectations ojthe Parties 
to a Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Preventing adequate enforcement of contract rights is not the 
only problem that the non-delegation doctrine has caused. Mean­
ingful enforcement of contractual rights may be had in the courts. 
Arbitration, on the other hand, is intended as an alternative that will 
provide for speedy resolution of differences because it is not subject 
to the delay and obstruction litigation in the courts normally en­
tails. 148 The scope of the non-delegation doctrine is developed on a 
case by case basis149 and the court may, in some cases, employ a 
balancing test to determine the appropriateness of the arbitration 
remedy}SO Therefore, a school committee suffering an adverse arbi­
tration award is encouraged to litigate the award, thus giving the 
courts, and not the arbitrator, the final say on the merits of the 
award}Sl The non-delegation doctrine, therefore, undermines the 
146. See, e.g., Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148 (holding that rein­
statement by the arbitrator is a delegation of managerial prerogatives); Dayton, 41 Ohio 
St.2d at 134,323 N.E.2d at 718 (holding that discretion is exercised in the formulation of 
the contract). 
147. Because management control of discretion is exercised at the time the contract 
is entered, see supra text accompanying notes 129-30, 144-45, the degree of public control 
is the same whether management discretion is exercised through formation of the con­
tract or while the contract is in force. See supra note 139. 
148. City of Lawrence v. Falzarano, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571, 581, 402 N.E.2d 
1017, 1024 (1980). 
149. Boston Teachers, 370 Mass. at 464 n.5, 350 N.E.2d at 714-15 n.5. 

ISO. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 

lSI. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 

593,596 (1960). While the courts necessarily have the final say on any arbitration award, 
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150C, § II (West 1982), excessive post arbitration review 
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speedy resolution of grievances through arbitration. 152 
Arbitration is also intended to provide for a predictable system 
of dispute resolution in which the final obligations of the parties will 
be made clear.153 But the predictability of exercising one's rights 
within the context of a public sector collective bargaining agreement 
has been reduced by the non-delegation doctrine. A recent Massa­
chusetts case makes this point clear. In School Committee v. 
Trachtman, 154 the court allowed the school committee to unilaterally 
reduce the teaching load of a teacher, for reasons unrelated to educa­
tional policy concerning curriculum 155 or teacher competence. 156 
Rather, it was to fulfill a "policy" requiring that 5.6 teaching posi­
tions be removed from the school committee's budget. 157 Consistent 
with Massachusetts' decisions allowing cash awards for contract vio­
lations,158 the arbitrator was permitted to award compensation. 159 
Though not at issue in the case, it would have been inconsistent with 
past decisions to allow the arbitrator to reinstate Trachtman. 16o 
As a result of the Trachtman court's decision, school committees 
have lost all but theoretical control of their budgets where they have 
agreed under a collective bargaining agreement to maintain certain 
teaching positions. If indeed the committee has a non-delegable 
management right to unilaterally reduce a teacher's workload and 
salary as part of a policy to remove 5.6 positions from its budget, that 
right is vitiated by the necessity to pay in the arbitration award what 
it hoped to save through the budgetary reduction. Thus, the protec­
can disrupt the arbitration process. Craver, The Judicial E'!forcement of Public Seclor 
Grievance Arbilralion, 58 TEX. L. REV. 329, 331 (1980). . 
152. See City of Lawrence v. Falzarano, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 571, 581, 402 N.E.2d 
1017, 1024 (1980). 
153. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574,581 (1960). 
154. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 541, 417 N.E.2d 459, affd, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2399,429 N.E.2d 703. 
155. Compare Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148. 
156. Compare Berkshire Hl1Is, 375 Mass. at 526-27, 377 N.E.2d at 942 (choice of 
principal). 
157. 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 544, 417 N.E.2d at 461. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
159. Trachlman, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2399, 429 N.E.2d at 704. 
160. Raymond, 369 Mass. at 690, 343 N.E.2d at 148; School Comm. v. Curry, 3 
Mass. App. Ct. 151, 157, 325 N .E.2d 282, 286-87 (1975), affd, 369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 
144 (1976); Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comrn. v. Berkshire Educ. Ass'n, 375 
Mass. 522, 529, 377 N.E.2d 940, 944-45 (1978). See New Bedford Educ., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 802,405 N.E.2d at 168. Cf. Doherty, 363 Mass. at 885, 297 N.E.2d at 495 (arbitrator 
may not supersede school superintendent's discretion by awarding teacher's 
appointment). 
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tion of management prerogatives that the doctrine affords in this in­
stance is illusory. 
Teacher Trachtman, on the other hand, though wrongfully dis­
charged, was not afforded an adequate remedy either. Compensa­
tion must be limited in time, 161 while one's appointment to'a 
particular position may last indefinitely. If the supreme judicial 
court had not applied the non-delegation doctrine to the foregoing 
situation, and presuming that the contract had not barred reinstate­
ment as a remedy, the anamolous result in Trachtman might not 
have occurred. If Trachtman had been reinstated shortly after the 
reduction occurred, his rights would have been protected more 
fully.162 The school committee, on the other hand, would have been 
free to make the reductions of 5.6 teaching positions through the 
agreed procedure without having to forfeit its intended savings. 163 
Trachtman, therefore, is yet another example of how the non-delega­
tion doctrine has undercut the ability of grievance arbitration to pro­
vide a speedy resolution to public employee disputes while adding to 
the uncertainty of exercising one's rights within the context of a pub­
lic sector collective bargaining agreement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Binding grievance arbitration, as provided for by Massachusetts 
law, is a desirable means of resolving employment disputes arising in 
the public sector. The effectiveness and efficiency of the grievance 
arbitration process, however, is frustrated by the non-delegation 
doctrine. 
The non-delegation doctrine requires that certain managerial 
prerogatives, delegated by the state to subordinate bodies, not be 
redelegated to third parties. It has been judicially applied in Massa­
chusetts in order to protect management rights and discretion so that 
public control over public schools will be preserved. 
The supreme judicial court has acknowledged the right of pub­
lic employees to bargain for certain contractual rights. Through ap­
plication of the non-delegation doctrine, the court has p~evented the 
grievance arbitrator from using the reinstatement remedy to enforce 
those rights unless the employer's ultimate discretion to discharge 
freely or deny an appointment to the employee is left unimpaired. 
Application of the doctrine in this way limits the effectiveness of ar­
161. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49. 
162. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
163. See 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2399, 429 N.E.2d at 704. 
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bitration in protecting contractual rights. By encouraging litigation, 
the doctrine undermines the ability of the arbitration process to re­
solve disputes quickly. Further, the doctrine limits the predictability 
of the public employer and employee's respective rights and obliga­
tions with anamolous results on the ability of the public employer to 
. rely on the contract in making managerial decisions. 
An arbitration agreement is reached through the voluntary pro­
cess of collective bargaining. The contents of a final contract, in­
cluding the scope and applicability of the grievance arbitration 
agreement, is a manifestation of mutual consent. The extent to 
which that process may be distorted by collective employee pressure 
is limited by the Massachusetts prohibition against public employee 
strikes. Thus, the focus of managerial decision making should be on 
the collective bargaining agreement and the scope of grievance arbi­
tration should be contained within that agreement. 
By focusing on the contract, and by requiring that any limits on 
remedies available to the arbitrator be contained within that agree­
ment, more effective protection of employee rights is possible. Fur­
ther, by eliminating ad hoc judicial relief from the constraints of the 
contract, the agreement to arbitrate will become more meaningful. 
Litigation as a means to seeking that relief will then be reduced, 
thereby increasing the speed of resolution through the arbitration 
process. 
Scott C Thompson 
